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How does the deregulation of medicine influence access to drugs?  This paper provides 
an economic policy assessment of the effects of medicine deregulation drawing on the 
Peruvian experience between 1991 and 2006.  As in other low-income countries, health 
insurance development is inadequate, drug expenditure is mostly paid out-of-pocket and 
approximately one third of the Peruvian population has limited access to ‘essential 
medicines’. Market deregulation in this context can exerte an impact on prices and hence 
reduce access to medicines.  Based on this evidence, we find that product and price 
deregulation of the medicines market appears to have reduced consumer trust of locally 
produced medicines, which in turn incentivised a switch to branded and more expensive 
drugs. The latter resulted in a further decreased access to medicines. 
 
 










Regulation is often identified as a potential barrier to entry and a source of 
inefficiency (Pelzman, 1989); hence deregulation can be seen as a mechanism for 
improving access to new products without undermining product safety, efficiency and 
efficiency. From a risk decision-making perspective, if benefits from greater access (e.g., 
lower cost) do not come with a major loss in quality and safety, then deregulation might 
be welfare improving. However, the latter depends on whether the market fails after 
deregulation and whether deregulation engenders other external effects. We can usefully 
look to markets for medicines in order to test the effects of deregulation, given that such 
markets tend to be regulated to ensure consumer trust alongside quality and safety. 
Regulation is especially important when the demand for pharmaceutical treatments 
depends largely on experts (e.g., doctors, pharmacists etc) who face different pecuniary 
incentives, and exhibit an informational advantage.  This is particularly striking in low-
income countries, where health insurance is limited and generally providers are paid on a 
fee-for-service basis.  
 
Rudimentary insurance and scant regulation provide limited incentives regarding 
quality of care
1
. Social insurance was as the primary model of health insurance in Latin 
                                                 
1
 Insurance schemes often act as risk pooling agents interested in obtaining better conditions from providers 
and accordingly counteract expenditure increases. Yet, when only concentrated in very affluent population 
groups as it seems to be the case in Latin American countries, underdevelopment of insurance stands as a 
drawback to the development of expected  contractual  incentives. 
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America before the insurance market opened for private providers (Mesa-Lago, 1991), 
especially as a source of funding for low-income groups (Cruz-Saco, 2001)
2
. Given that 
most social security programs exhibited low coverage, and faced both high administrative 
costs and some degree of corruption, this fuelled calls in the early nineties to deregulate 
the health care market.  
 
Strategies for ensuring access to medical treatments include reducing the overall 
cost of health care (including manufacturing and distribution costs) as well as setting the 
policy agenda to focus on reduced drug costs both in developing and developed countries. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, some strategies to ensure access to drugs include financing 
and delivering health services in a cost-effective way. Mechanisms for cost-containment 
introduced in the market for medicines by industrialized countries have included national 
drug formularies, non-reimbursable drug lists, restricted reimbursement schemes, price 
regulation, promotion of generic prescribing and substitution, and surveillance of 
prescribing costs (WHO, 1993). However, the latter, insofar as it requires some degree of 
market regulation, is at odds with deregulation strategies to expand the role of market in 
the delivery of low cost treatments. The benefits of medicines deregulation have been 
much debated (Prayle and Brazier, 1998), but little evidence exists on the subject. The 
evidence from Peru can furnish us with some insights in this area. 
 
                                                 
2
 The WHO reports that unlike in wealthier countries, in 47 low-income countries, out-of-pocket payments 
represent more than half of total health expenditures, which means that some share of the population is 
deterred from using health services or from continuing treatment because they cannot afford to pay (WHO, 
2007). 
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This leads us to the following puzzle: in the absence of large information 
asymmetries, deregulation would be expected to increase competition and cut prices, as 
well as lead to improved access to medicines. On the other hand, in the presence of 
informational advantages as in the the prescription and dispensation of medicines, 
regulation can be argued to play a key role in counteracting information advantages by 
guaranteeing quality standards (and enhancing consumer trust). Hence, whether de-
regulation is welfare improving is an empirical question that calls for examining evidence 
from deregulation case studies around the world. The latter includes identifying the effect 
of deregulation of drugs authorisation and pricing on access to drugs. Given that we lack 
sufficient quantitative data from a full-scale evaluation, we can instead provide an 
assessment based on one or several markets.  
This paper draws upon the deregulation of medicines authorisation in Peru to 
examine the impact on the quality of, and access to, medicines. We argue that medicines 
deregulation triggered two effects: a) it gave rise to some level of distrust towards 
cheaper alternatives to branded products, hence raised average medicines prices which in 
turn reduced access, and b) it reduced product surveillance, in turn leading to a lowering 
of the average quality of medicines. Therefore, we suggest, that medicines deregulation 
can exert detrimental effects by eroding trust in the quality of local products, to the 
benefit of international companies. The paper contains some additional policy 
recommendations and suggestions on potential effects of market deregulation. 
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The next section contains a description of the Peruvian market, which is followed by a 
market overview as a result of the deregulation process. Section 5 explores barriers to 
entry.  
 
2. The Peruvian Market 
 
Since 1995, the 2006 Index of Economic Freedom has ranked Peru as “mostly 
free”3, but still far from being a pluralistic democracy and a free market. Governance 
quality has been generally poor. More generally the public sector has remained 
significantly bureaucratic and underfunded which has led some to propose processes of 
deregulation. However, how deregulation impacts on access to health care is still an open 
question. One mechanism would suggest that poor governance quality could influence 
health care access. Drugs are essential inputs for effective health care delivery. 
Alternatively, limited insurance coverage and lack of institutional capacity to regulate the 
process from medicine authorisation to distribution throughout the country appears to be 
an insurmountable barrier. The Peruvian government in the period examined undertook 
institutional reforms through decentralisation, whereby some health care responsibilities 
were delegated to administrative provinces. However, it did not fundamentally change 
the way the public sector operates in the country.   
 
Peru ranked in the period examined amongst the most deregulated markets in 
Latin America with the Peruvian economy becoming increasingly market-oriented in the 
1990s. In line with most countries in the region, the health system could be characterized 




as being significantly fragmented. A poorly financed Ministry of Health service 
(MINSA) provided coverage to 40% of the population
4
 (Arroyo, 2002), 25% would be 
covered by a social insurance scheme (Esalud), which in practice applies to those with 
formal employment, 3% are covered by the army and police fund, and 10-12% paid for 
coverage by directly contracting private sector providers. However, 25% of the 
population did go without insurance for medical treatment as the 35% of those partially 
covered by the Seguro Integral de Salud (SIS) specifically designed for mothers and 
children, did not provide access to drugs. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Access to drugs not only depends on the prices of originator medicines as has 
been found in other markets (Gemmill et al, 2007), but also on factors such as the 
efficiency of drug distribution, and the proliferation and availability of generic substitutes 
(Costa-Font et al, 2014a,b), but more importantly on insurance (Pradhan and Prescott 
2002) and the active participation of physicians.  For instance, the institutional capacity 
to evaluate the quality of the products in the market is fundamental to ensuring adequate 
access to suitable treatments (e.g., prioritising which medicines are to be funded and 
ensuring safe distribution networks are key to efficient drug distribution). In other words, 
improving access to drugs is not only a matter of lowering drug prices, but also, more 
fundamentally, of developing an adequate institutional capacity to distribute treatments 
                                                 
4
 See http://www.minsa.gob.pe/portal/ 
 8 
to people in need, enhancing consumers' trust and improving insurance coverage
5
 and 
market regulation tools.  
 
3. Deregulation of Medicines in Peru 
 
Peru, in the period under examination, had the most market-oriented and deregulated 
market for medicines of all the countries in South America. In the drug market sector, 
deregulation encompassed both free pricing and limited public intervention (with the 
Decreto Legislativo 757, November 1991). The practical implication was that the 
regulator exerted very minimal control of the drug market (Miranda Montero, 2004). The 
1992 Decree (Decreto Ley 25596) and the General Health Bill 26842 passed in 1997 
established that authorisation was to be granted automatically “after 7 days of a product 
application”.  The latter was a practical deregulation given the limited administrative 
capacity to swiftly process market authorisation requests. Under this system the failure to 
notify a decision on a product application within the set term was interpreted as an 
acceptance of the application
6
.  Furthermore, a 5 year registry would bear a cost of barely 
90 US $, which fell short of reasonable investment in guaranteeing product quality.  Only 
a small proportion of products could be audited, which in turn created the opportunity for 
discretion in registration decisions.   
 
                                                 
5
 A comprehensive insurance package and private insurance stands as a product on the hand the richest 
quintile of the population along with some civil servants. 
6
 Legal requirements to register a product are very loose and refer mainly to inclusion in seven international 
pharmacopoeia -drug lists from European countries, Japan and US - without the need of reporting evidence 
of effectiveness nor drug quality except  for a personal declaration of safety and efficiency and, the 
registered drug must  be commercialised in the country of registration. 
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Another knock-on effect of deregulation was on the market entry, as it is not until 
within 30 days of market launch that it became compulsory for manufacturers to 
communicate the launch of a product to the health authorities. Limited investment in 
information systems to exert some control over the quality of the medication hampered 
quality assurance even further (see Table 2).  
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
The 2997 General Health Bill  (26842) regulated market authorisation conditions. 
However, the real capacity for influence of the General Directorate for Medicines 
(DGMID) was bypassed by other political authorities, and weakened by underfunding. 
The latter ensured that the Directorate had very little real capacity to intervene and was 
not an independent agency  of the Ministry of Health.  
 
 
4. Effects on Medicine Affordability and Prices 
 
 
The affordability of medicines is an important market barrier to access to 
medicines in low-income countries given that50-90% or more of pharmaceutical 
expenses are out-of-pocket purchases (WHO, 1998). That much of the cost of 
medications falls to the individual is exacerbated by drug prices being higher in low-
income countries relative to high-income countries. For instance, as Figure 1 below 
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shows, even when medicine taxation was jettisoned, medicine prices failed to fall. Figure 
1 reveals that until 1990, as expected, consumption of medicines followed a similar trend 
to that of sales and prices of medicines.  However, after the deregulation and price 
liberalisation of the 1990s there was a significant fall in volume and rise in average drug 
price, which suggests that prices after the deregulation process tripled whilst volume 
declined. Peru experienced a decline in number of units sold in 2000 (Valladares, 2001), 
which did not follow the pattern of sales in other countries. The real costs per medicine 
unit was estimated to be 1.04US$ in 1980 and increased to 5.4US$ in 2000 (AIS, 2003). 
Overall, Peruvian patients experienced greater difficulties in the accessing medicines 
after market deregulation.  
 
Explanations for this phenomenon include the expansion of product copies, which meant 
that only products manufactured by leading international companies were trusted
7
.  In 
such a scenario, the strategy of such companies was to focus solely on the share of the 
population that revealed a solvent demand, which explains why branded products 
represented 35% of the market through the period. Secondly, deregulation encompassed 
market failures in the drug distribution system such as inefficiencies in the drug 
prescription system
8
, and a study by Cruzado (1998) demonstrated that from all drugs 
registered in 1996, 40% had no therapeutic value. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
7
 IMS data suggests that international companies attained during the period about 75% of the market share 
8
 In addition, 20% of total drugs consumed were illegally sourced; namely they have not been approved or 
registered whatsoever.   
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Finally, deregulation exerted a spill-over effect in reducing access to generic 
product. Indeed, given the limited warrantee that generic products are bioequivalent to 
originators, they were regarded as a whole as low quality products, which did reinforce 
even more the incentive’s to keep prices of branded products higher than ever. The latter 
is the case insofar as high prices signalled quality.   
 
5. Effects on Medicines Access 
 
Expenditure per capita on drugs ranged between 4-27 US $ according to the Encuesta 
Nacional de Hogares 2003-2004, though only 50% of patients that obtained prescriptions 
were able to fill them in 1997 (Ministerio de Salud, 2005). Similarly, 98% of patients in 
need of HIV treatments had no access to medical treatment (Vargas, 2002). Households 
were allocating 43-77% of their budgets to medicines (Petrera, 2003), and more 
specifically data from the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2000 shows that 60% of the 
health budget was devoted to drugs.  
 
Medical treatments for certain conditions, such as bacterial meningitis, could cost as 
much as 164% of the average household income in Lima and 185% elsewhere in the 
country if originator drugs were consumed.  However, costs could drop to 17.2-11.5% if 
the cheapest drug was prescribed instead (AIS, 2001). That is, access to generic drugs 
did make a significant difference for the Peruvian population. However, possibly the 
most important barrier to access was limited insurance coverage, both for its direct effects 
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on drug costs (Costa-Font et al, 2012) as well as its indirect effects over doctors’ 
prescription guidelines.  
 
The vast majority of the market for drugs referred to products purchased out-of-
pocket (70%) (DGMID, 2005). Distributors (wholesalers and retailers) managed to attract 
mark-ups ranging between 24-30%, and on top of that they could even obtain additional 
discount. Some studies indicate that lack of regulation was responsible for such 
arbitrariness in price formation (Valladares, 2002; AIS, 2001). Unsurprisingly, given the 
proliferation of out-of-pocket medications and limited insurance coverage, self-
medication became common practice despite consumers' very limited knowledge and the 
information asymmetry benefiting doctors and pharmacists (e.g., consumers were often 
subjected to the “self-interested advice” of pharmacists). Generic use was not an option 
given the limited bioequivalence warranty, which led people to place their trust in 
originator products. The latter posed significant barriers to the dispensation of low-cost 
alternatives (market penetration by unbranded generics was limited to less than 8% of the 
total volume), insofar as they were perceived as low-quality products in those 
circumstances as has occurred in other markets (Costa-Font at al, 2014b).  . 
 
 
Finally, drug market deregulation seems to be associated to market fragmentation. Only, 
a few companies managed to compete with originator products and as Figure 2 exhibits, 
the penetration of large and vertically integrated distribution chains achieve 52% of the 
market share, suggesting competition at the distribution level was poor.  
 
 13 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Evidence suggests an increasing concentration of economic activity at the retailer 
level as well, consistent with Figure 3.  The number of pharmacies has declined since the 
late nineties, possibly as a result of the deregulation of the drug market. Retail 
pharmacists were subject to very limited constraints and had an ever-higher capacity to 
influence patients’ medicine purchasing decisions. Although patients could apparently 
choose from a range of drugs, in practice the influence of retailers was remarkable (e.g.,. 
they could decide to offer only a small selection of products). In addition, pharmacy 
retailers could even influence the prescription by employing doctors.   
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
Another constraint to medicines competition lies in the development of quasi-generics. 
Originator companies developed their own generic products to counteract the effect of 
mainstream generic products. Furthermore, although doctors should by law prescribe the 
generic version of a medication, evidence suggests that only about 48% of drugs were 
indeed generics (Vargas Giron, 2002). Again this phenomenon can be traced back to the 
absence of quality assurance arising from the introduction of the deregulation process. 
Overall, medicine deregulation seems to have kept medicines prices artificially high, thus 
reducing access.   
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5.  Discussion 
 
This article has sought to examine the question of market deregulation on access to 
medicines. I draw upon evidence from Peru from 1991 to 2006 to argue that the Peruvian 
experience provides important lessons on the role of institution-building, and moreover 
on the role that market regulation exerts when insurance coverage is limited and 
consumers rely on trust when selecting products.   
 
The deregulation of both drug authorisation and pricing in the context of significant 
information asymmetries is argued to have exacerbated the market failures that already 
existed in the market for medicines. More specifically, limited regulation and poor 
quality assurance may have reduced consumer trust in medicines. The beneficiaries of 
such an erosion of market trust we argue results from  international pharmaceutical 
companies offering extra quality assurance compared to local substitutes. The latter 
produced counterproductive effects on aggregate prices: average medicine prices more 
than tripled in the period examined, and the market share of branded products increased 
dramatically. The latter has important ramifications on allocative efficiency of health care 
resources, as low priced bioequivalent products are not consumed.   
 
We conclude that price regulation and product authorisation are essential features of the 
efficient working of the medicines market in low-income countries. Unlike in other 
markets, when insurance coverage is limited, individuals are key agents in the medicine 
consumption process and not insurance institutions. Hence, consumer trust in non-
 15 
branded products can be potentially eroded as a result, and influence prices by reducing 
the number of trustworthy products. Hence access and the mechanisms of product 
competition between stakeholders are strongly affected by price deregulation.  
 
 It seems reasonable to argue that in view of the evidence gathered, some form of product 
and price regulation system should be re-introduced for publicly reimbursed prescription 
drugs, and incentives to enhance consumer trust in non-branded products could 
potentially influence the expansion of generic drug consumption. The main way to reduce 
the financial burden of the costs of medicines on households is to ensure that prices are 
brought to the lowest attainable level. That can be accomplished variously by promoting 
competition among quality generic medicines where off-patent items are concerned, 
negotiation of prices, and therapeutic competition for on-patent medicines. A new 
regulation (Law 29459 in 2009) has been put in place to tackle some of these issues; the 
consequences of market deregulation dynamics are expected to have long-lasting effects. 
This is an area for further quantitative research.  
 
The Peruvian experience suggests that regulation requires a minimum institutional size to 
satisfy with efficacy the demands for both efficiency and safety of a modern health 
system. The latter is not incompatible with guaranteeing the respect for property rights 
but also essential rights such as safety and access to quality of health care.  In this study 
we find that without a minimal dimension and some institutional capacity to guarantee 
regulation enforcement it is unlikely for a health system to manage to improve health care 
efficiency. More specifically, judging by the Peruvian evidence, self-regulating market 
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mechanisms seem to have failed in attaining the expected goals they should deliver under 
high information asymmetries and poor insurance coverage. Reforms in such a setting 
should instead prioritise the modernisation of the health system to improve the 
information systems, expand insurance coverage expansion, regulate authorisation to 
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References and Tables 
Table 1. Drug expenditure distribution in 2005 
 











Extreme Poor 21% 4.7 3.9 5 3.4 
Poor 31% 18.6 10.1 10.9 8.8 
Not poor 48% 76.7 27.2 28.7 21 
Source: DGMID, 2005. 
 
Table 2 . Drug Regulation Criteria 
 
 Organisation Process 
Registration DGMID Automatic after 7 days 
Reimbursement Only for Esalud No 
Distribution DGMID No requirement with a sworn declaration 
Quality Assurance DGMID Post-commercialisation auditing of 
product quality in the market 
Source: DGMID, 2005. 
 




Source : Vargas Giron, 2002. 
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Source: ADIFAN, 2006. 










1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 
 
Source: ADIFAN, 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
